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Abstract
In this paper, I first retrace some aspects of a dynamic theory of humans in society, and
then highlight what appear to me as major contributions of two papers of this special
issue. This leads me to highlight a series of questions, which I address through two
other consonant studies on remembering, the work of Harald Welzer and his team on
the memory of WWII in three generations in German families, and the study by Steve
Brown and Paula Reavey on people’s remembering of the London bombings.
Keywords
Imagination, collective memory, intergenerational transmission, vital memories,
prolepsis
An interesting turn is currently happening in the study of memory, as authors
both critically reread classical theories of remembering and thinking, and free
themselves from approaches that consider memory as something about ade-
quately preserving the past, in mind or in artefacts. Dynamic approaches of
remembering are developed, showing the social and cultural making of individual
remembering and the part of each act of remembering in the making of the
social, as well as the future orientation of remembering (Boyer & Wertsch,
2009; Brown & Reavey, 2015; de Saint-Laurent, 2014; Murakami, 2012;
Wagoner, 2013, 2015), and as this special issue shows. Perhaps this move reﬂects
a more general tendency in some parts of the social sciences, where authors try to
go beyond fragmentation in the study of social and psychological phenomena.
This integrative movement is undertaken both by engaging in more abstract and
general theorization, and by relying on general dynamic theories, reﬂecting other
moves in philosophy and sciences in general (Salvatore, 2016; Zittoun &
Gillespie, 2015a; Zittoun & Valsiner, 2016).
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which should be used for any reference to this work
In this paper, I ﬁrst retrace some aspects of a dynamic theory of humans in
society, and then highlight what appear to me as major contributions of two papers
of this special issue. This leads me to highlight a series of questions, which I address
through two other consonant studies on remembering, the work of Harald Welzer
and his team on the memory of WWII in three generations in German families
(Tschuggnall & Welzer, 2002; Welzer, 2008; Welzer, Moller, Tschuggnall, Jensen,
& Koch, 2002), and the study by Brown and Reavey (2015) on people’s remem-
bering of the London bombings.
Remembering as part of the dynamics of mind
An eﬀort of sociocultural and critical approaches in psychology has been to reinstate
an authentic developmental science—that is, a science that tries to apprehend human
experience in society in time (Valsiner, Molenaar, Lyra, & Chaudhary, 2009; Zittoun
et al., 2013). From a general developmental perspective, one entry is to focus on the
constant mutual constitution of mind and society through an analysis of semiotic
dynamics. Such focus allows to concentrate on the ﬂow of consciousness—or semio-
tic stream that constitutes our experience—and the dynamics by which we constantly
construct the world as it is given to us. From such perspective, people’s attempt to
‘‘make sense’’ of any aspect of their experience demands dynamics of linking past
experiences with ‘‘the given’’ of a situation as we apprehend it. This given is itself
organized in a world partly made or conﬁguration of signs crystallized into material
and symbolic cultural artefacts. This process can be analyzed at diﬀerent levels of
granularity—from the smaller microgenesis of semiotic process (Salvatore, 2016;
Valsiner, 2007) to more general dialogical dynamics involving others and cultural
elements (Markova´, 2016; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015b).
Recently, we have proposed to consider these processes through the particular
entry of imagination—seen as the psychological experience of temporarily leaving
the here-and-now of the present to explore past, alternative, or future experiences,
through the uses of past experiences, various semiotic means, social interactions,
and symbolic resources (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). At this level of granularity,
human experience and sense making can be conceived as a loop—moving in and
out of the surface of the given immediate semiotic stream, to apprehend it through
the perspective given by these various resources. This loop, we have proposed,
always demands, yet to variable degrees, the linking of past experiences with
future and present ones. The return to the present, charged with this semiotic
loop, necessarily produces a change of experience—an emotional, at times embo-
died, change, or reconﬁguration of meaning, or an opening of possibility to act.
In other words, this loop transforms the semiotic stream in which we live, whether
at the microgenetic level in the here-and-now, at an ontogenetic level—opening
new life choices—or at a more sociogenetic scale, when new societal futures are
made possible—from ﬂying to the moon, to leaving European Union.
From that general developmental, and necessary dynamic perspective, remem-
bering thus appears as one particular case of imagination, or even, semiotic
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process—these looping processes that are particularly oriented toward the past
before coming back to the present, whether it is to answer the questions of a
researcher (as in de Saint-Laurent, 2017) or to make political plans (as in Bresco´
de Luna, 2017).
More speciﬁcally, individual remembering demands certain semiotic loops, ori-
ented toward what is culturally consider as the past, enabled by personal past
experiences (aﬀective, emotional, physical, generalized) or by cultural elements in
the present (documentaries, monuments, pictures), interactions with others, as well
as social representations (de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press). Remembering a
collective past can be in contrast conceived as remembering something about a
conﬁguration of events in the past, which aﬀected many lives in an interrelated
manner, and collectively designated as such. Of course the events do not need to be
the same for various individuals or even for diﬀerent groups: hence World War I
included many events, which are very diﬀerent for a Silesian farmer and a Prussian
general; these meanings also change with time.
These preliminary considerations highlight two basic principles of collective
remembering: one is its inherent developmental nature; the other is the necessary
tension that the notion presupposes between individual and collective acts of
memory. The two papers presented in this section fully respect the ﬁrst principle,
and beautifully explore the second aspect. I now examine them in turn, and high-
light three questions they raise.
Dynamics of prolepsis
Bresco´ de Luna (2017) usefully recalls the notion of prolepsis, developed in the ﬁeld
of literature critic and expanded by Cole within cultural psychology (Cole, 1996,
2007). He uses the notion to question a linear conception of memory, to which he
opposes a narrative view, for which a proleptic movement implies ‘‘an imagined
scenario that pulls the present towards the future through a certain way of recon-
structing the collective past’’ (Bresco´ de Luna, 2017, p. XX). In that sense, it is
through a loop oriented toward the future that historians, activists or political
groups can design the past leading to their current present to be changed.
The innovative proposition that such developmental perspective allows, thus, is
to consider the collective past as a constant construction-in-the-making oriented by
an evolving imagination of the future.
From this perspective, two questions can be raised in the light of our knowledge
about imagination. The ﬁrst one is, what is it that is used to imagine the future that
will guide certain constructions of the past, rather than others? And is the poten-
tiality of these engrossed futures not precisely enabled and constrained by these
resources? Thus, for instance, in a religious discourse, the possible imagined futures
are constrained by a set of beliefs (e.g., the survival of one’s soul in another world,
which allows to disengage from the problem of the future of life on earth), and
these in turn guide the reading of the past (e.g., in which the mythical death of a
leader grounds the hope of eternal blissfulness). In political games, the same
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happens: totalitarian powers limit the creation or access to cultural elements nour-
ishing diverse possible imaginations of the future, by repressive means and/or by
redundancy of only one discourse (Markova´, 2017) (e.g., the supremacy of a group
of individuals under the leadership of an elected guide), and thus restrict the read-
ing of the past (e.g., a foundational myth announcing the guide), thus justifying
the present (e.g., submitting to the leader and accomplishing the supremacy of the
given group). In that sense, what sort of cultural elements would be needed to open
alternative futures which, in turn, would allow groups to develop rich, open, inter-
esting reading of their past, so as to get a better, polyphonic, grip over their com-
plex present?
A second question raised by this paper is that of authorship. At this scale of
analysis—collective prolepsis—one may wonder who does the imagining, and for
whom, and in turn, who is doing the remembering? Is it the same person—activists,
political leaders, or teachers—or groups? Or is one person or group providing
elements (e.g., dystopian ﬁlms) for others to imagine (e.g., a general public desta-
bilized by recent political events), and third ones to remember (e.g., politicians
imagining a blissful, problem-free past)? In the ﬁrst case, versions of collective
futures and pasts might be deliberately crafted to convince electors, to polarize pub-
lic opinion, to ﬁnd support, or to bring hope to a depressed population. In the
other case, the ones might not have any intentions about changing the sense of past
of the others—yet their changed understanding of past and future is just a bypro-
duct of these distributed proleptic processes. Hence, as de Saint-Laurent nicely
shows (2017), a person’s discovery that academics are building certain versions
of the collective past might bring him to radically change his present actions,
turning him from a scholar to more of an activist. In any case, it may be useful
to question these chain dynamics leading to the emergence of unexpected futures
and past imaginations.
Dynamics of social positioning
Given the importance of authorship—who is remembering, with whom in mind, and
for whom—it is most welcome that de Saint-Laurent focuses on such issues in her
original analysis. At the scale of ontogenesis, her paper shows that a given person’s
imagination of the collective past is itself evolving according to what she calls a
‘‘trajectory of remembering’’ along the lifecourse. As in Bresco´ de Luna, remember-
ing is always in tension with imagining the future. In addition, the originality of the
paper is to retrace how, at diﬀerent moment of a lifecourse in various sociocultural
situations, marked by speciﬁc individual and collective ruptures, memory is crafted
by a person, engaging in various memory acts, enabled by various resources, with
speciﬁc present others as well as others in mind, and using also their memory of
having previously remembered the past. The genealogy of one’s evolving imagination
of the past is thus a history of past encounters and dialogues, and the richness of one’s
remembering results from the partial or complete integration of themany positions in
memory acts one has adopted through life.
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The paper also furnishes a model that allows identifying the multiple dimensions
of remembering, ‘‘for example new interlocutors, access to novel information,
development of alternative social positions for the self, mastery of diﬀerent narra-
tive frames, emergence of new concepts and understandings of history, etc.’’
(de Saint-Laurent, 2017, p. 263). Here as well, we can see that the material used
for remembering is not always produced by people using it, and so, in the
recounted case study, the person’s access to resources depended on the others
with whom he engages in memory acts. The paper thus highlights the ever-going
dynamic or of generating imagination of the collective past. It also gives leverage in
the possibility of changing people’s relation to the past and therefore the future—it
is not only a matter of how the past is recounted, it depends also by whom and in
what conditions. More importantly, the model might also give us an access to
understand the refusal that some people or group may have to certain versions
of the past—which can be understood in terms of position impossible to hold, for
instance for emotional or belonging reasons.
This thus raises a third question, that of the interplay between the various others
with whom people engage in memory acts over time—and the possible consonant,
or contradictory eﬀects (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a). Indeed, not all others are
equal to self: we have elective relations to our closest ones, our ‘‘signiﬁcant’’
others, and their positions in memory work may have diﬀerent valences
(Zittoun, 2013).
Interrelated intimate lives and the past
It is to try to highlight these valences of speciﬁc others that I wish to rapidly turn to
the work of Welzer on German families over three generations. Welzer and his team
interviewed 40 families over three generations, the older member being an eyewitness
of World War II, often a perpetrator (Tschuggnall & Welzer, 2002; Welzer, 2005;
Welzer, Moller, & Tschuggnall, 2013). Welzer shows that although some elder mem-
bers of families openly speak about crimes they observed or even perpetrated, their
children avoid or ignore these memories, and their grandchildren would ﬁnd a way to
express how much their grandparent did refuse the system, or support the Jews, or in
one way or another took some risk—‘‘grandpa was not a Nazi.’’
In the following series of quotes, reported in Welzer (2005, pp. 9–11), we see
such transmission and transformation of memories of the collective past. First,
91 years old Elli Krug, who lived near Bergen-Belsen during the war, explains
that she didn’t know about camps (such statements have long shown to be
false). She explains how, after the war, British forces requested her to host sur-
vivors, former inmates on their way out of the camps:
Elli Krug: The Jews were the worst afterwards. They really harassed us . . .. They sat
there and made us serve them, and then they didn’t want . . .. We had this big hayloft
[where] they slept overnight. . . .The Jews and Russians, I always made sure that
I didn’t get them. They were really disgusting, you know?
5
Asked about these events told many times by his mother, her son also explains that
people did not know about the camps. Yet in parallel, he refers to a story recounted
by his wife about someone living near Bergen-Belsen at the same time, who did hide
escapees (which, per deﬁnition contradicts the ‘‘not knowing’’); he calls this person
‘‘the grandma’’:
Bernd Hoﬀmann: The grandma hid some of them, and they sat in a wooden box.
Then [the SS-men] went around, searching everywhere . . .. They would have shot the
grandma immediately. She put a hot pot with boiling potatoes on top of the wooden
box so they wouldn’t get them.
Finally, the 26 year-old granddaughter, exposed to these narrations, tells her ver-
sion of what her own grandmother did:
Silvia Hoﬀmann: Once she told a story I thought was really interesting: Our village
was on the road to Bergen-Belsen, and she hid someone who escaped from one of
those transports, in a really interesting way, in some grain box with straws sticking
out—she really hid them. Then people came and looked in her farmyard and she kept
quiet. That’s a little thing that I really give her a lot of credit for.
Obviously, the granddaughter’s remembering of the story of the grandmother has
been fully recomposed: in this narrative, the grand-mother (Ms. Krug) did not at
all refuse to host Jews; in contrast, she hid them in a wooden box—a narrative
element borrowed from the story about the ‘‘grandma’’; the place for hiding is a
mixture of the hay of the ﬁrst story and the box of the second one. But this active
creation is not a ‘‘memory failure’’: it is an active, yet not deliberate, reconstruction
of an event belonging to the collective past, in which a close, loved person is
involved.
This process of transformation of events of the past is systematic enough in the
data collected by Welzer and his group, for them to name it ‘‘cumulative heroisa-
tion.’’ According to the author, ‘‘cumulative heroisation’’ can be explained by the
coexistence of two logics. On the one hand, because of Germany’s huge eﬀort to
educate about the Holocaust, younger Germans have been systematically taught
about the history of war, the responsibility of Germans in the Shoah, etc. This
‘‘cognitive’’ education is reinforced by an over-abundance of ﬁlms, novels, TV
series, commemoration, and memorial trips to which the postwar generations
have been exposed. On the other hand, people live with a subjective feeling of
loyalty to their own families. Their need to protect their own family members
would explain the need to recognize the public murders, but to totally isolate
these from their relation to their own grandparents.
In the light of what has been exposed so far, we could also understand this as
follows: the older generation of Germans, their children and their grandchildren,
relate diﬀerently to the events of the past. For the oldest, the past was once their
present; they now relate to it using as resources the traces of their own experience,
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but also all the mediatic discourses that are available (in other examples,
Welzer shows how personal anecdotes are mixed up with scenes from
Remarque’s descriptions of the war front (Remarque, 1989), or from ﬁlm depic-
tions of the war (Welzer et al., 2013)), and so address their families in certain
terms—either to show them the past as it was and that there is nothing to hide,
or to protect them. For their grandchildren, two distinct types of relation to the
collective past coexist, both of them imaginations of a past they haven’t experi-
enced. The ﬁrst has as others the teachers, school friends and generalized others,
and it uses as resources the formal material and the modalities of historical rea-
soning, with a strong normative proleptic function of ‘‘never again’’ letting similar
event happen. The second modality of imagining the past has as other a beloved
grandfather or parent, and as resources a mixture of family stories, other narratives
heard, and other symbolic resources—here the proleptic function is meant to
save the morality of the family. Because of the ‘‘loyalty’’ to family members, or
the positive emotional valence, the position of the other—the grandparent—can be
taken, but is ﬁlled with what is acceptable to self. This is totally incompatible with
what is taught in the other context of formal education, with other others and
resources.
Hence, two types of memory act (de Saint-Laurent, 2017) are generated, with
diﬀerent others; and given the emotional valence of intergenerational ties, the latter
survives untouched by the former. The paradoxical eﬀect of this cleavage in inter-
generational remembering of collective past is that, as Welzer (2005) underlies, the
younger generation celebrates the heroic resistance of their forefathers (even when
they have been openly active perpetrators)—thus putting resistance as role model.
The more negative consequence of this cleavage is that people build a dichotomic
representation of the Nazis (them) and the Germans (the good us), and maintain
unwillingly an uncritical racist discourse about the Jews. Othering the Nazis and
the Jews creates semantic barriers (Gillespie, Kadianaki, & O’Sullivan-Lago, 2012)
so strong that it makes impossible taking their positions and fully seeing the events
from their perspectives (Welzer, 2005).
Interrelated public lives and the past
The tension between personal memories and collective remembering, and the sat-
uration of others in collective remembering that enters in concurrence with more
private remembering, is also addressed by Brown and Reavey in a chapter named
‘‘Remembering with, through and for the others. Surviving the 2005 London
bombings’’ (Brown & Reavey, 2015, pp. 133–154). Here, the authors explore the
work of constituting a traumatic experience into a personal and then a collective
memory for the victims of the London bombings, and the consequences these
collective memories have back on people’s personal remembering of the collective
past, using the metaphor of the Mo¨bius strip.
The authors emphasize in particular the process involving persons who externa-
lized their intimate, embodied experience publically—through blogs, books, or
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documentaries, as ‘‘survivors often can feel similar moral obligation to tell their
own story, because it is part of the narrative mosaic that constitutes the collective
memory of 7/7’’ (Brown & Reavey, 2015, p. 136). These events become
‘‘vital memories’’, turning points that redeﬁne their life trajectories. In many
cases, the stories allow others to recognize and name their own experience, through
the semiotic mediation these provide and the perspective they allow (e.g., on recon-
stituting what happens when the bus blew up). This externalization thus became
symbolic resources to others and a mutual, collective fabric of shared memories.
However, once externalized, these discourses are crystallized, and can be used
also by other agents—political, mediatic, activists, etc.—who can develop stereo-
typical discourses and identify ‘‘guilty’’ parts. Personal externalizations,
initially meant to give shape to a personal memory and sharing into building a
collective one, became thus proleptically used as part of a political agenda. For
instance, John Tulloch appeared cover in blood on the front cover of one British
tabloid, pictures used in favor of a reinforcement of anti-terrorist laws.
In a third movement, these collectivized stories come back to people, who might
not recognize themselves in these now shared, or doxa version of the past. Hence,
the same John Tulloch did not support the laws his image was meant to support;
yet this newspaper representation of him became part of his personal remembering
of what has become a collective past. Such recomposition of personal memories
might lead, paradoxically, people to disengage from the collective remembering, as
they then feel that the latter eventually blocks them in one version of the past, thus
denying the speciﬁcity of their own experience and its possible development. One of
the woman involved thus explains how she felt ‘‘quite bored by your own story’’
(Brown & Reavey, 2015, p. 152), and ‘‘for John Tulloch, the way out has been to
refuse a straightforward status of victim’’ (Brown & Reavey, 2015, p. 152).
Hence, Brown and Reavey’s analysis shows how people ﬁrst need to elaborate
their experiences into semiotic forms to be shared with others, and second, see these
grow and join the ﬂow of discourses and artefacts constituting collective remem-
bering—with all its possible uses as symbolic resources for other persons, but also,
normative and proleptic uses by institutional others. In a third movement, people
need to free themselves from their participation in acts of building and maintaining
a memory of the collective past, in order to redeﬁne personal futures for their
own present lives. In other words, the loops in which these single persons engage
get intertwined with collective work, through intense position exchange; but
the only way to be able to close the loop is to disentangle self from the collective,
that is, close positions, so as to preserve some subjectivity and the possibility of
development.
Expanding dynamic studies of collective remembering
In this paper, I started by underlying the importance and interest of dynamic
approaches of memory and especially collective remembering, that contribute to
a developmental understanding of human in societies. Underlying proleptic
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dynamics—how the futures is bounded in the past and back in the present, de
Saint-Laurent shows trajectories of remembering in the lifecourse, and Bresco´ de
Luna highlights the memorial work in the development of communities and
nations. In addition, bringing in insights from position exchange theory, de
Saint-Laurent shows the importance of the others with whom one remembers, in
presentia or in absentia—these others, whose position we endorse, are constitutive
of the memory act (de Saint-Laurent, in press). Through time, as the others change,
memory necessarily evolves through the multiplication of perspectives.
In order to dialogue with these readings, I proposed to read memory of the
collective past as a variation of imagination, which led me to formulate three ques-
tions, all related to the distributed nature of remembering about the collective past:
these concern, ﬁrst, the authorship of the resources used for remembering—it may
not be the same persons that produce the elements that can be used as resources to
remember, that those that use them; second, the authorship of collective remember-
ing; and third, the weight and valences of the others in remembering.
These questions, I have addressed by complementing my reading of Bresco´ de
Luna and de Saint-Laurent’s papers with a rapid presentation of two other
dynamic studies of memory of collective past, that of Welzer (2005) and of
Reavey and Brown (2015). First, in both cases, there is a distribution of remem-
bering over time and people; second, the production of memory artefacts for cer-
tain purposes by certain persons (e.g., survivor’s testimonies to help others, ﬁlms
about the past to avoid future catastrophes) are used by others in very diﬀerent
ways—to dissociate family memories from more ‘‘public’’ rememberings of the
past, or to make sense of one’s own life. Interestingly, in both cases, these uses
bring to a dissociation of memories of the collective past, and personal, subjective
memories related to this past—whether one’s own experience of events, or one’s
close ones. Finally, regarding the third question, we saw in Welzer’s case that the
others with whom one is closely emotionally related can have a radical prevalence
over distant others, thus blocking the possibility of adopting these second positions
of the past. The immediate need to preserve a relation to close ones even brings to
radical transformations of past narrations, for which all kinds of resources are used
to build a past compatible with such futures. In Brown and Reavey’s case, the
immediate need to preserve one’s subjectivity brings, at some point, to distance the
person from the position of others, so as to enable the emergence of new futures.
Hence, as a whole, adopting a dynamic, sociocultural development understanding
of collective remembering proves fruitful. It involves, as shown in this section, a con-
sideration of the future in the imagination of the past, and others in remembering; but
also, as suggested in these lines, the emotional valence of various others with whom
one is related, and the existential need to preserve a personal sense of integrity—
subjective, but also embodied—beyond various imperatives to collectively remember.
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